Not Citizens, But Persons:the ethics in action of performance's intimate work by Jones, S.P
                          Jones, S. P. (2012). Not Citizens, But Persons: the ethics in action of
performance's intimate work. In M. Chatzichristodoulou, & R. Zerihan
(Eds.), Intimacy Across Visceral and Digital Performance. (pp. 26-38).
Palgrave Macmillan.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
Simon Jones/ M. Chatzichristodoulou and R. Zerihan, Intimacy Across Visceral and Digital Performance,
2012,Palgrave Macmillan reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published,
version of record is available here: http://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230348868 and
http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137283337
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
 1 
NOT CITIZENS, BUT PERSONS: 
THE ETHICS IN ACTION OF PERFORMANCE’S INTIMATE WORK 
 
 
In responding to 9/11 through a critique of Austin’s speech-act theory, Mark 
Franko writes: 
 
Now the event that ‘happens to us’ ‘mocks’ … [our] understandings of the 
speech act. The event, in other terms, is neither conventional, logocentric, 
nor iterative. The singular presence of ‘what takes place’ takes the place of 
the performative, and mocks it, displaces it, and supersedes it. In other 
terms, the event disarms the performative by effectively removing its 
capacity to respond. The event leaves the act ‘speechless’. (in Lepecki, 
2004, p.116) 
 
I want to compare two scenes of wrighting history in recent British theatre – one 
from The World in Pictures (2006) by Sheffield-based Forced Entertainment, the 
other from Make-Believe (2009) by Manchester-based Quarantine – as possible 
answers to this ‘speechlessness’. They both express something of a return in 
contemporary performance to story-telling, more precisely an anxiety around 
accounting for global forces and how they impact on everyday life, that is, a 
concern for the making of histories. Performance generally is anxious – to say 
something meaningful, about geopolitics, war and terror. There is a risk that this 
could lead to an erroneous re-objectification of performance: how, against its 
own eventness, its true or proper work is seen to be at the discursive level of the 
‘issue’ (consider the current interest in verbatim theatre: see Barnett, 2005, 
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Boon, 2007, Bottoms, 2006, Paget, 1990, Rebellaton, 2007, Young, 2009). The 
same thinking had reached its previous apogee in the 1970s expressing ‘the 
personal is political’, heralding ‘political dramas’ exploring various ‘socio-political 
issues’, within which even the most intimate desires were extrapolated from the 
person and grouped into verifiable categories depending upon ‘objective’ criteria, 
such as class or gender or race. As Foucault had pointed out about the general 
force of history-making in his championing of post-structuralist historiographies: 
 
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function 
of the subject: the guarantee that everything which has eluded him may be 
restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without 
restoring it in a reconstituted history. (Foucault, 1970, p.12) 
 
This objectification is not without value, especially at certain critically political 
times: to follow Foucault again, it at least allows one to name oneself as victim. 
In reaction to this, during the 80s and 90s, many artists provocatively attended 
to the fragment with its transitory desires, ignoring capital’s base-urges of fear 
and want with its terrors. The current anxiety around performance is because 
reality now appears too real to either ignore or trivialize. However, that reality 
never went away: we have always indulged the fragment and then returned 
home to the Grand Narrative (look at soap operas). Desire as the positive force 
of capital has always existed in relation to terror, the negative force. So, in 
response to capital’s current crisis and apparent return to terror, both of the 
world and of its own capacities to transform that world, two contradictory but 
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intimately related terrors, performance is in danger of two apparently 
contradictory re-turns. Firstly, towards the objectification of the Grand Narrative, 
to tell stories again of owning a central Self or at least one in lifelong debt to the 
bank. And the second, towards the subjective, away from terror and its 
imperative of collective responsibilities, back towards the womb, towards 
infantilism, producing a world of absurd and carefree play where nothing really 
matters. 
 
The hearsay of history-writing, so central to the outrage provoked by verbatim 
theatre, epitomizes this first re-turn in enabling a community of citizens to 
stabilize around the ‘proof’ of what was said, or rather, its re-saying on stage. 
Paradoxically, the primary work of this hearsay-saying is reassurance: to put our 
minds and their imaginations at rest by not only determining the past and 
confirming that we are already right in our opinions about it, but anticipating the 
probable outcomes of specific situations derived from that past which will occur 
in the future, thus connecting up what was with what could be in the closed loop 
of a narrative logic, effectively predetermining both interpretations of that past 
and speculations upon possible futures. Like the mother’s breast, this force of 
reassurance is profoundly relational. History can only be knowledge-able if it is 
first relational, that is, capable of being written down, then circulated and 
articulated amongst a community of initiated knowers, experts, scholars, doctors, 
engineers, artists, and finally judged as useful, that is, applicable. History-
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writing, hear-saying is meaning-making, in effect, converting anxious, lonely 
persons into inter-related, mutually responsible citizens. However, Forced 
Entertainment and Quarantine open up the possibilities of an altogether different 
wrighting of history between a fragmentary, deconstructive relativism and a 
cosying-up of always already justifiably outraged citizenry, the possibility – in the 
suspension of judgement inherent in the performance-event itself – of the 
emergence of a third figure between the person and the citizen – the responsible 
person. 
 
Both The World in Pictures and Make-Believe attempt to construct histories of 
the world through a wrighting that draws attention to its own making, both in 
order to challenge their audiences’ senses of history and explore to what extent 
we are today made by those histories: the former from a classically postmodern, 
deconstructive turn; the latter from the personal testimonies of its performers 
drawn from Britain’s migrant communities: the one layering pastiched 
stereotypes on top of each other in a palimpsest of B-movie cod-histories; the 
other rooted in specific family stories inherited by the performers. Both play with 
the appearing on stage of the person amongst the citizenry in two very different, 
but resonant scenes of wrighting world-history. In The World in Pictures, after a 
sequence of cartoon characters from cavemen to the present day ‘represent’ the 
‘entire’ history of the world, a performer (Jerry Killick) stands before the 
audience and extends that knowingly simplistic chronological logic into a history 
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of the future: the perfect tense is re-conjugated into the future perfect: the 
happened into the will-have-happened. By way of this surprising linguistic shift, 
the audience moves from the ‘objective’ (read ‘intellectually superior’) observer 
of a classically postmodern, comically ironic re-presenting (which incidentally 
risks the return to the infantile, beloved of apologists for irresponsibility), to an 
awkward, subjective sensing of one’s own body in that seat in that theatre in 
that moment. This transformation from witnessing a pageant of picture-book, 
de-personalized, ‘state’ History, to confronting their own mortality, is felt as a 
mood of profound unsettling, realized from what one likes to call the series of 
moments that make up one’s life. Through a linguistic turn that proposes the 
future as if it had already happened, the ontological fact of one’s own death, in 
all its Freudian apoplexy and Heideggerian anxiety, is made real personally as 
the person appearing from out of the anonymous crowd of witnesses, both alone 
in the world and already virtually dead. 
 
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death 
reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-
relational, and which is not to be outstripped. (Heidegger, 1962, p.294) 
 
Although one knows one is sitting amongst a theatre audience, hearing this 
proposing of a possible future as a certain past, one feels alone. This together 
aloneness is produced by forcing the narrative logic of history-writing intimately 
alongside the absolute non-relationality of one’s own death, thus denying, in the 
very instance of its proof – that is, its telling, the force of history. One’s anxious 
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need to reassure oneself that one is part of an answer to terror, in effect, part of 
the Grand Narrative, is provoked by the very same act of telling, which, through 
its future-perfect mood, instantly revokes the possibility of any reassurance in re-
minding one of one’s own future, one’s own death. It is this intimacy that 
occasions the scene’s queasy disquiet, the falling away of collective laughter, to 
be replaced by shuffling in seats, as it becomes clear that the performer will 
progress through the predetermined logic of his future-history beyond each one’s 
death to the end of the world, of time itself and the very history that will have 
already been told. 
 
Quarantine’s Make-Believe too attempts to wright a history of the world, 
however, by crucially different means and with a critically different outcome. 
Echoing Forced Entertainment’s aesthetic, a group of performers bring chairs and 
sit down in front of heavy, red curtains before the audience, and invite them to 
list the key events in world history. What emerges through this dialogue is a set 
of audience-members’ attitudes to both the specific task itself (on the night I was 
there ranging from serious engagement to sarcastic attempts at trashing) and to 
the very process of constructing a history. Through humour and solemnity, the 
gaps and lacunae in the possibility of any single history telling  ‘the whole story ‘ 
were made apparent, not only the facts of events (the ‘objective’), but also the 
diversity of points of viewing those facts (the ‘subjective’). A play of power 
emerged amongst the audience and performers, which had up until then only 
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been obliquely alluded to in the personal accounts of the performers’ own family 
stories of migration to and experiences in Britain. In this way, the larger 
geopolitical, economic, imperial ‘state’ History, which the audience were by and 
large automatically producing, was folded into the particularities of personal 
histories, occasioning a growing self-awareness of each one’s and each other’s 
agencies in telling histories. 
 
With The World in Pictures agency was first invoked and then instantly 
vanquished in the fact of personal death, the possibility of authentic living thus 
disabled in the shift from de-personalized, cod history to the personal eventuality 
of death. Strangely, although facing his audience, the performer’s future-perfect 
had the effect of leaping over the now-here of that face-to-face encounter. 
Whereas Quarantine choose to stage their dialogue within that inbetween: 
effectively, the very event of the dialogue itself demonstrates the possibilities for 
constructing futures in negotiating possible pasts: now-here the saying of what 
for Forced Entertainment will already have been said enables an ethical play 
between various subjective and objective positions and pro-positions to be 
communally produced and entertained. 
 
This ‘saying to the Other’ – this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, 
this relation with an existent – precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate 
relation in Being. (Levinas, 1969, p.48) 
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Furthermore, the exchanging of possibilities between audience-members and 
performers, the discussing of how each ‘fact’ may relate to the accumulation of 
this particular history, is progressively felt to require a suspending of judgement: 
the sarcastic contributor is gently but resolutely challenged and the dialogue 
flows past them and on, exposing their remark for its intent to collapse into the 
already said the opportunity for possibility. And the longer judgement is thus 
suspended the deeper the understanding that the actually existing facts of each 
person’s own history can be collectively seen as both a given and a point of 
departure. The presence of a two-year-old child (hopefully with much more 
ahead of him than behind him) and his parents as performers reinforces this 
requirement to understand both the gift and the opportunity of our histories, to 
feel what in Emmanuel Levinas’ terms would be the unlimited responsibility for 
the other. 
 
The act of consciousness is motivated by the presence of a third party 
alongside of the neighbour approached. A third party is also approached; 
and the relationship between the neighbour and the third party cannot be 
indifferent to me when I approach. There must be a justice among 
incomparable ones. There must be a comparison amongst incomparables 
and a synopsis, a togetherness and contemporaneousness; there must be 
thematization, thought, history and inscription. (Levinas, 1998, p.16) 
 
Thus, to follow Levinas further, this dialogue makes not only the constructedness 
of any historiography apparent and problematically rooted in each one’s own 
personal experience, but, in the intimacy of its exchanging and gathering 
together by means of the task, also overcomes any traumatizing of the person in 
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their own death: it opens up each one’s infinite responsibility for the other 
actually in the event of dialoguing. 
 
The approach, inasmuch as it is a sacrifice, confers a sense on death. In it 
the absolute singularity of the responsible one encompasses the generality 
or generalization of death. … But we can have responsibilities and 
attachments through which death takes on a meaning. That is because, 
from the start, the other affects us despite ourselves. (Levinas, 1998, 
p.129) 
 
This capacity of performance to disclose, what I would name, a third character 
somewhere between person and citizen goes somewhat further than Tracy 
Davis’s important contribution to our understanding of theatricality as a 
necessary component of being an active citizen in a democratic society: ‘a person 
must decide to be a spectator, not merely a witness, engaged and conscious of 
the transaction of display and reception’ (in Davis & Postlewait, 2003, p.129). In 
making this decision, she argues that ‘it is the act of withholding sympathy that 
makes us become spectators to ourselves and others’ (ibid. p.154), thereby 
inaugurating the citizen in recognizing the theatricality of civil society and power. 
However, this decisive act condemns each to occupy one of two mutually 
discrete positions: that of the traditionally subjective and, therefore, emotionally 
manipulable person in the crowd; or that of the classically objective and, 
therefore, emotionally disinterested citizen sitting on the jury of history. The one 
character lacks clarity, decisiveness and the ability to see beyond the moment; 
the other can only judge by way of commonsense and precedent, normatively 
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and unfeelingly, reducing others to the status of objects in Zola’s ‘experimental 
cage’. So, whilst many theatre-makers may now be attending with an especial 
urgency to questions of rights and justice, that is, in Davis’s terms, how the 
theatrical makes a space for citizens to appear, I would propose that a more 
primary problem, for which performance is quintessentially better suited, is how 
to make a space for persons to appear before each other. This both precedes our 
daily necessity to act as citizens and exceeds it: indeed, our working sense of 
citizenship is but a shorthand, a ready reckoner to the much more complex 
problem of becoming a person, about which most people have very little to say. 
 
The person hides in the citizen: it avoids embarrassment and eases itself 
amongst society dressed as a citizen: it worries it is doing things correctly: so 
much so that at the end of the day everything civil is simply and only a matter of 
etiquette and manners, although getting such matters wrong can lead to 
genocide and wars, as evidenced by the family histories of Quarantine’s 
performers. However, the person is not adequately expressed by way of the 
social, through proclaiming their ‘gender’ or ‘sexuality’ or ‘ethnicity’, since such 
things can never belong to them: they are socially owned and legally stated. And 
yet the problem of the person is occasioned by society, by acting as a citizen, 
because what provokes the person to realize that it has this problem with its 
personhood is its inevitable mixing with other persons. The full and immediate 
depth and extent of this problem is made manageable by thinking of other 
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persons as a society and as such embodying ‘reasonable’ and ‘sociable’ 
behaviour accordingly. Whilst this may do for the everyday, the problem re-
emerges in one’s solitariness, at night alone, or sudden sense of distance and 
confusion in the crowd, or face to face with the beloved. At these points we 
cannot avoid the perturbing encounter with our own personhood and its 
struggling to be. And even then, this is not about ‘becoming an individual’ or 
‘expressing one’s self’ or ‘achieving one’s potential’, since the individual is, of 
course, a social construct whose appearance shows how the social shifts its 
frames of reference from time to time in order to provide an easily graspable, 
ready-to-hand solution for the everyday. No, finally, the person is not an 
individual, describable by way of class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality or body-mass: 
a person is a style; and the problem of the person is precisely how to realize and 
sustain a style for the particularities of each person’s personhood, how to 
perform. 
 
A style is a certain manner of dealing with situations, which I identify or 
understand in an individual. … I experience the unity of the world as I 
recognize a style. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.327) 
 
Performance’s contribution to this problem is that it allows the person to appear 
before the citizen: before in two senses: in front of them, standing suddenly 
before them in space; and preceding them, having a life previous and a history, 
before them in time. This is unique to performance: the person in society. In the 
novel, the person may appear in the reader’s imagination; in film, before the 
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viewer as image; in music, as wonderful abstraction. But only in performance, as 
person in touch, in both flesh and word, in space and time: and this appearance 
is a miracle and so can only be recognized outside of the everyday in theatres. 
Ordinarily, the many miraculous appearances of personhood go unnoticed in the 
everyday. However, in (extraordinary) performance, as with The World in 
Pictures, we are obliged to attend to it: the person provokes us citizens to shed 
our civil protection and, as a gathering, approach this (new) figure as persons. 
 
The Other not only comes to us from a context [the world] but signifies by 
itself, without that mediation. … [T]his mundane signification [of the world] 
is disturbed and upset by another presence, abstract (or more exactly, 
absolute), non-integrated in the world. That presence consists in coming to 
us, making an entry. Which can be stated thus: the phenomenon that is the 
apparition of the Other is also face; or again (to show this entry at every 
instant new in its immanence and essential historicity of the phenomenon), 
the epiphany of the face is visitation. (Levinas, 2006, p.31) 
 
This co-presence of persons founds performance: you and me and them 
appearing before one another: a person facing another person understood by 
(way of) the (excluded) third – the citizen. The performance-event only exists 
through the complicit and inclusive encountering of communal attending, of 
spending time together, of dialoguing. Furthermore, this coming together 
produces difference, a standing-out in the crowd, a recognition that this very 
inbetween, across which we come together, is also a gap that divides us, an 
incomplete medium, or rather, a bundling of media (middles) each with their 
very own kind of incompleteness, their very own histories. So, this dialoguing 
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jointly sustains an attending to not-knowing or the problem of knowing, that is, 
the problem of the person, ‘out-standing standing-within’ (Heidegger, 1978, 
p.192). 
 
The performance-event remains only for as long as the citizen has not yet 
incorporated what differentiates it from the person, which is precisely the 
person’s problem of becoming. If the citizen attempts to take their place both in 
and out of this relation person to person, to judge it, then the style of the person 
will always exceed the description and laws of that citizen-judge. So much so 
that the citizen is forced to judge the very applicability and validity of those laws, 
the same laws that authorize that citizen to be and to judge. In this way, the 
person provokes the deconstruction of the citizen: this is the particular ethico-
political dimension of Make-Believe’s invitation to re-wright history. 
 
A relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within 
the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, 
as a face to face, as delineating a distance in depth – that of conversation, 
of goodness, of Desire. … The I is not a contingent formation by which the 
same and the other, as logical determinations of being, can in addition be 
reflected within a thought. It is in order that alterity be produced in being 
that a ‘thought’ is needed and that an I is needed. The irreversibility of the 
relation can be produced only if the relation is effected by one of the terms 
as the very movement of transcendence, as the traversing of the distance, 
and not as a recording of, or the psychological invention of this movement. 
(Levinas, 1969, p.39-40) 
 
So, by ways of the face-to-facing, the constituting of the person happens as a 
‘traversing’, a crossing across the void that separates the one from the other, 
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through the wrighting of a history. These crossings across the in-betweens 
opened out between persons and histories, the various re-wrightings, disclose 
the discontinuities between senses of perception and selves, technologies and 
texts, citizens and persons, which our everyday need to get on with life would 
seek to cover over and occlude, but which performance forces to appear. The 
forcing inherent in this encounter is what I have called elsewhere performance’s 
de-second-naturing at work (see Giddens & Jones): to express what it feels like 
to be in-between the in-betweens, in the middle of the middle of things: the 
undoing of the strong bonds of comparability the word with the thing with the 
event, the jangling of the strong harmonies of synchronicity the ear with the eye 
with the room and our times, the wrecking of the strong principles of complicity 
our self with our world with our histories. True discontinuity, the actually felt 
irruption of out-standing standing-within is felt as both a mood of de-naturing 
and an instant when-where one’s self is forced out of its self, interested in (in the 
sense of esse/being inter/between) the world. Make-Believe provoked this 
interest. 
 
The other as other, as a neighbour, is in his presence never equal to his 
proximity. … Between the one I am and the other for whom I am 
responsible there gapes open a difference, without a basis in community. … 
Proximity is a difference, a non-coinciding, an arrhythmia in time. … The 
unnaratable other loses his face as a neighbour in narration. The 
relationship with him is indescribable …, unconvertible into a history, 
irreducible to the simultaneousness of writing, the eternal present of a 
writing that records or presents results. (Levinas, 1998, p.166) 
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In the performance-event this is felt as a temporary perturbation before one 
returns to the everyday – the shift of tense from perfect to future perfect; the 
opening up of a dialogue that exposes ideological positions and our investment in 
them. And in order to make this re-turn to the everyday, to become once again 
passable as a citizen, the re-naturing of our natures must happen, but never 
quite in the same way as before, that is, with a style now not quite one’s own, or 
rather, one’s own style obliged to answer the call and tremble at the touch of 
another’s – the person to person of the human. In this re-manifolding of the 
person into the citizen, something remains of performance’s third character set 
free to range about the world. And this something, this thingsome – for want of 
any better word, will always be inbetween the Self, the Subject, the person and 
the citizen, inbetween senses and words, inbetween fleshes and their histories – 
the responsible person. 
 
True to the radical alterity of its nature, it is this responsible person’s 
thingsomeness that ensures that performance’s intimate work cannot be 
appropriated to found a society, a re-formation of the Human, because its very 
driving forces always exceed the stabilizing and reassuring bent of any citizenry. 
Effectively, performance as event is a gerund halfway between action and thing, 
idea and matter: it never solidifies in its various multifarious furies into a 
community with its principles, opinions and objectives. And yet, however 
fundamentally impersonal, to follow Levinas, its wrighting only works by way of 
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the person before the other: it can only be felt personally by way of the other, 
that is, experienced in the particular modalities of becoming-person as one 
possible amongst a host of all possible possibles of personhood. So, performance 
uniquely actualizes Levinas’ understanding of the person coming into being 
between the totality of the world and the possibilities of infinity. In responding to 
our felt speechlessness when confronting capital and terror, both Forced 
Entertainment and Quarantine go beyond the reassuring hearsay of writing 
history, with its tendency to stabilize Subjects with their objectified relations to 
normative interpretations of the Grand Narrative, towards producing in the 
saying a third figure, actualized some no-where now-here in the performance-
event itself, between citizen and person – the responsible person. 
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